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Abstract—We consider the problem of secure communications
over the two-way wiretap channel under a strong secrecy criterion.
We improve existing results by developing an achievable region
based on strategies that exploit both the interference at the eaves-
dropper’s terminal and cooperation between legitimate users. We
leverage the notion of channel resolvability for the multiple-access
channel to analyze cooperative jamming and we show that the
artificial noise created by cooperative jamming induces a source
of common randomness that can be used for secret-key agreement.
We illustrate the gain provided by this coding technique in the case
of the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, and we show significant
improvements for some channel configurations.
Index Terms—Key generation, resolvability, secure communica-
tions, strong secrecy, two-way wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN CRYPTOGRAPHY, noise is often viewed as an impairmentthat should be handled at the physical layer before any
encryption is applied. In contrast, the works of Wyner [1] and
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] on the wiretap channel, and Maurer [3]
and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [4] on secret-key agreement from
common randomness support the idea that there is much security
to be gained by exploiting the noise present at the physical layer.
This concept, colloquially known as physical-layer security, has
attracted a growing interest and has led to numerous extensions
of the wiretap channel model [5], [6].
In particular, the analysis of multi-user channel models with
secrecy constraints has highlighted the pivotal role of coop-
eration, jamming, and feedback as means to increase secure
communication rates. The two-way wiretap channel, in which
users communicate over a noisy bidirectional channel while
an eavesdropper observes interfering signals, combines all the
aforementioned effects because users have the possibility of
cooperating while simultaneously jamming the eavesdropper.
This model was first investigated by Tekin and Yener [7], [8]
who showed that jamming with noise or controlled interference
between codewords could provide secrecy gains. However, this
strategy called cooperative jamming does not exploit feedback.
It was later shown by He and Yener [9] and Bloch [10] that
strategies based on feedback can perform strictly better than co-
operative jamming alone. Recently, El Gamal et al. [11] proposed
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an achievable region for the two-way wiretap channel combining
cooperative jamming and a secret-key exchange mechanism to
transfer secure rate between users.
From a practical perspective, the two-way wiretap channel
captures some of the limitations of real systems because all
communications are intrinsically rate-limited. We note that the
two-way wiretap channel also generalizes many models; for
instance, the works of Amariucai and Wei [12], Gu¨ndu¨z et
al. [13], and Lai et al. [14] are special cases that focus on
secure communication for one user only. Similarly, the model of
Ardestanizadeh et al. [15] is a two-way wiretap channel in which
one of the link is confidential and unheard by the eavesdropper.
Many works on secret-key agreement with rate-limited public
communication can be analyzed within this framework [16], [17]
as well.
In this paper, we extend existing results in several directions.
We show that it is possible to design powerful coding schemes
by partially decoupling the feedback and the interference and by
relying on the following strategies:
• Cooperative jamming, which leverages codeword interfer-
ence to give legitimate users an advantage over the eaves-
dropper by reducing its signal-to-noise ratio.
• Key exchange, by which one user sacrifices part of its secret
rate to transmit a key to the other, which uses the key to
encrypt a message, thus augmenting its own secret rate.
Note that key exchange is a basic feedback mechanism that
transfers secure rate from one user to the other, but does not
generate new secrecy.
• Key generation, by which the users exploit the intrinsic
randomness of the channel to generate a secret key. Since
channels are noisy, the communication required to distill the
key is inherently rate-limited. The key is then used by one
of the users to encrypt a message, and to increase its secret
communication rate.
We establish strong secrecy results, which require the eavesdrop-
per to obtain a negligible amount of information instead of a neg-
ligible rate of information, by exploiting the concept of channel
resolvability [18]–[22] to analyze cooperative jamming. Channel
resolvability provides a conceptually convenient interpretation of
cooperative jamming, which allows us to analyze what happens
when transmitting beyond the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we provide
definitions of a two-way wiretap channel and a wiretap code. In
Section III, we derive a region of strongly secure rates achievable
with cooperative jamming based on channel resolvability. This
first step yields a result similar to what Tekin and Yener [7,
1556–6013/$26.00 c© 2011 IEEE
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Theorem 2] obtained for weak secrecy. In Section IV, the
region is improved by introducing the key exchange mechanism
proposed in [9], [11]. We further extend this region by performing
secret key generation from a source induced by the noise used
in cooperative jamming. Finally, in Section V, we illustrate the
achievable region in the Gaussian case. Section VI concludes the
paper by discussing possible extensions of this work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Notation: Consider two random variables X and Y taking
values in alphabets X and Y . Sample values of X and Y are
denoted by x and y, respectively; the joint probability law is
denoted by pXY , and the marginal probabilities are denoted by
pX and pY , respectively. We suppose all probability laws either
discrete or Gaussian. The mutual information between X and Y
is the random variable:
I(X;Y ) , iX;Y (X;Y ) where: iX;Y , log2
pXY
pXpY
.
We refer to the average of the mutual information random variable
as the average mutual information, and denote it by
I(X;Y ) , E(I(X;Y )),
the entropy corresponds to H(X) = I(X;X). The weakly typical
set with respect to distribution pX and  is denoted An (X).
Finally, we let δ() (resp. δ(n)) be a short-hand notation for any
function of  (resp. n) that goes to zero as  goes to zero (resp.
n goes to infinity). We also introduce the integer interval Ja, bK
consisting of all integers between bac and dbe.
We consider the problem of secure communication over a two-
way wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1, in which:
• a legitimate user called Alice (or transmitter 1) sends mes-
sage M1 and estimates M2;
• another legitimate user called Bob (or transmitter 2) sends
message M2 and estimates M1;
• an eavesdropper called Eve observes Zn.
We assume the channel is full-duplex, which means Alice and
Bob communicate simultaneously over the channel. This assump-
tion is relevant for some communication systems; however, it may
be hard to realize in practice and many experimental communica-
tion systems operate with half-duplex, potentially yielding lower
rates. The analysis of half-duplex channels is left as future work.
Definition 1: A two-way wiretap channel denoted by(
X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Z,
{
pY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn1 Xn2
}
n>1
)
consists of two
arbitrary input alphabets X1 and X2, three arbitrary output
alphabets Y1, Y2 and Z , and a sequence of transition
probabilities
{
pY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn1 Xn2
}
n>1 such that:
∀n ∈ N∗,∀ (xn1 , xn2 ) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 ,∑
yn1 ∈Yn1
∑
yn2 ∈Yn2
∑
zn∈Zn
pY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn1 Xn2 (y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn1 , xn2 ) = 1.
(1)
We consider hereafter a memoryless wiretap channel, but we
note that our approach and our results generalize in part to
arbitrary channels using information spectrum methods [20].
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probabilities
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n￿1 such that:
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Fig. 1. Communication over a two-way wiretap channel
Definition 2. A memoryless two-way wiretap channel (WTC2 for
short) denoted by
￿X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1Y2Z|X1X2￿ is a two-way
wiretap channel for which:
∀ (xn1 , xn2 , yn1 , yn2 , zn) ∈ Xn1 × Xn2 × Yn1 × Yn2 × Zn,
pY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn1 Xn2 (y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn1 , xn2 ) =
n￿
i=1
pY1Y2Z|X1X2
￿
y
(i)
1 , y
(i)
2 , z
(i)|x(i)1 , x(i)2
￿
. (2)
Now, we formally define a code for the two-way wiretap
channel.
Definition 3. A
￿
2nR1 , 2nR2 , n
￿
two-way wiretap channel code
Cn consists of:
1) Two message alphabets: M1 =
￿
1, 2nR1
￿
and M2 =￿
1, 2nR2
￿
.
2) Two local sources of randomness (R1, pR1) and (R2, pR2)
independent of the channel and messages.
3) Two sets of encoding functions that map a message and
past channel observations to a channel input symbol:
• n encoding functions for transmitter 1:
∀i ∈ ￿1, n￿, f (i)1 :M1 × Yi−11 ×R1 → X1;
• n encoding functions for transmitter 2:
∀i ∈ ￿1, n￿, f (i)2 :M2 × Yi−12 ×R2 → X2.
4) Two decoding functions that map channel observations to
a message or an error symbol “?”:
• g1 : Yn1 ×M1 ×R1 →M2 ∪ {?};
• g2 : Yn2 ×M2 ×R2 →M1 ∪ {?}.
We also define the following quantities to assess the perfor-
mance of a code Cn:
• the probability of error:
Pe(Cn) ￿ P
￿
(M1,M2) ￿= (Mˆ1, Mˆ2)|Cn
￿
;
• the information leakage to the eavesdropper:
L(Cn) ￿ I(Zn;M1M2|Cn).
Definition 4. A rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable for a WTC2 if
there exists a sequence of codes {Cn}n￿1 such that:
• lim
n→∞Pe(Cn) = 0 (Reliability);
• lim
n→∞L(Cn) = 0 (Strong secrecy).
Fig. 1. Communication over a two-way wiretap channel
Definition 2: A memoryless two-way wiretap channel (WTC2
for short) denoted by
(X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1Y2Z|X1X2) is a two-
way wiretap channel for which:
∀ (xn1 , xn2 , yn1 , yn2 , zn) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 × Yn1 × Yn2 ×Zn,
pY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn1 Xn2 (y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn1 , xn2 ) =
n∏
i=1
pY1Y2Z|X1X2
(
y
(i)
1 , y
(i)
2 , z
(i)|x(i)1 , x(i)2
)
. (2)
Now, we formally define a code for the two-way wiretap
channel.
Definition 3: A
(
2nR1 , 2nR2 , n
)
t o-way wiretap channel
code Cn consists of:
1) o essage alphabets: 1
q
1, 2n 1
y
and 2q
1, 2n 2
y
.
2) o local sources of rando ness ( 1, p 1) and ( 2, p 2)
independent of the channel and essages.
3) o sets of encoding functions that ap a essage and
past channel observations to a channel input sy bol:
• encoding functions for trans itter 1:
J , K, (i) : i ;
ti s for tr itt
J K
o decoding functions that ap cha l s r
r r sy ?”:
e als fine the fo lo ing quantities to a t r r
t ilit r :
e( n) ,
(
( 1, 2) 6 ( ˆ1, ˆ2)| n
)
;
• the infor ation leakage to the eavesdropper:
L(Cn) , I(Zn; 1 2|Cn).
Definition 4: A rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable for a WTC2
if there exists a sequence of codes {Cn}n>1 such that:
• li
n
Pe(Cn) 0 (Reliability);
• li
n
L(Cn) 0 (Strong secrecy).
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Definition 5: The strong secrecy capacity region R¯2W is de-
fined as:
R¯2W , cl ({(R1, R2) : (R1, R2) is achievable}) .
We denote by R2W the weak secrecy capacity region.
We are interested in characterizing the entire region of achiev-
able rate pairs (R1, R2), but it is rather difficult to obtain
a closed-form expression. In principle, the coding scheme in
Definition 3 could simultaneously exploit the interference of
transmitted signals at the eavesdropper’s terminal and feedback.
To obtain some insight, we study instead a simpler strategy that
partially decouples these two effects as follows:
• First, we exploit interference to penalize the eavesdropper
and increase secure communication rates. The interference
can be of two types: interference between codewords or
jamming with noise.
• Next, we introduce feedback by means of key exchange
and key generation. With key exchange, one user sacrifices
part of its secure communication rate to exchange a secret
key, whereas with key generation both users exploit channel
randomness to distill keys. Those keys are then used to
encrypt messages with a one-time pad.
III. RESOLVABILITY-BASED COOPERATIVE JAMMING
A. Cooperative Jamming
A natural attempt to increase secure communication rates con-
sists in jamming Eve with noise, in order to decrease her signal-
to-noise ratio. This strategy, called cooperative jamming [23],
forces one user to stop transmitting information to jam the
eavesdropper. To overcome this limitation, Alice and Bob can
use codewords whose interference also has a detrimental effect
on Eve without sacrificing as much information rate. This scheme
is called coded cooperative jamming and was introduced by Tekin
and Yener [7], [8]. It is possible to combine both strategies and
have Alice and Bob perform coded cooperative jamming while
simultaneously jamming the eavesdropper with noise. Simulta-
neous cooperative jamming can be implemented by prefixing an
artificial discrete memoryless channel (DMC) before the WTC2
and sending codewords through the concatenated channels. This
technique is therefore called prefixing in [11].
Note that cooperative jamming does not exploit feedback,
which corresponds to using only two encoding functions f (1)1
and f (1)2 in Definition 3. Using cooperative jamming is then
equivalent to studying the simplified channel model illustrated
in Fig. 2, in which the eavesdropper observes the output of a
multiple-access channel.
B. Achievable Region
We first derive an achievable region using the notion of channel
resolvability and auxiliary messages M ′1 ∈ M′1 ,
q
1, 2nR
′
1
y
,
uniformly distributed, and M ′2 ∈ M′2 ,
q
1, 2nR
′
2
y
, uniformly
distributed, in place of (R1, pR1) and (R2, pR2). This region is
given in Proposition 1.
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Fig. 2. Communication over a two-way wiretap channel without feedback
Proposition 1.
R = Proj
R1,R2
￿
p∈P


R1
R2
R￿1
R￿2

￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
R1 +R
￿
1￿ I(Y2;C1|X2)
R2 +R
￿
2￿ I(Y1;C2|X1)
R￿1 +R
￿
2￿ I(C1C2;Z)
R￿1￿ I(C1;Z)
R￿2￿ I(C2;Z)

⊂ R¯2W, (3)
where ProjR1,R2 is the projection on the plane of rates
(R1, R2), and:
P = {pX1X2C1C2Y1Y2Z
factorizing as: pY1Y2Z|X1X2 pX1|C1 pC1 pX2|C2 pC2}. (4)
Remark A similar result has been independently established
by Yassaee & Aref [24] using a related technique based on
approximation of output statistics. However, their proof only
holds for discrete memoryless channel because it is based on
strongly typical sequences. In our proof, we use Steinberg’s
results [19], which hold for Gaussian memoryless channels.
Proof of Proposition 1:
In this proof, we consider two types of transmitted messages.
First, the main messages, which must be transmitted between Al-
ice and Bob reliably and securely with respect to Eve. Second, the
auxiliary messages, which are used to perform coded cooperative
jamming and introduce randomness to mislead the eavesdrop-
per. Although auxiliary messages do not carry information by
themselves, we require that Alice and Bob decode them reliably.
We also perform simultaneous cooperative jamming by prefixing
DMCs.
The proof is based on random coding. We fix distributions pC1 ,
pC2 , pX1|C1 and pX2|C2 . Let ￿ > 0.
Code creation: We create the code as follows:
• Code generation: we generate the codewords at random:
Generate
￿
2nR1
￿￿
2nR
￿
1
￿
i.i.d. sequences cn1 (µ1) with µ1 =
(i, j) ∈M1×M￿1 according to pC1 , and
￿
2nR2
￿￿
2nR
￿
2
￿
i.i.d.
sequences cn2 (µ2) with µ2 = (i, j) ∈M2 ×M￿2 according
to pC2 . Here, i represents the index of the main message,
j the index of the auxiliary message. We denote by Cn the
random variable representing the generated code and by Cn
one of its realizations.
• Encoding: If Alice wants to send µ1 ∈ M1 ×M￿1, she
computes cn1 (µ1), and transmits x
n
1 obtained by sending c
n
1
through a DMC with transition probability pX1|C1 .
Similarly, if Bob wants to send µ2 ∈M2×M￿2, he computes
cn2 (µ2), and transmits x
n
2 obtained by sending c
n
2 through a
DMC with transition probability pX2|C2 .
Fig. 2. o unication over a t o- ay iretap channel ithout feedback
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1
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2
,
1| 1 a 2| 2 . et  .
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enerate
⌈
2nR1
⌉⌈
2nR
′
1
⌉
i.i.d. sequences cn1 (µ1) ith µ1
(i, j) 1 ×M′1 according to pC1 , and
⌈
2nR2
⌉⌈
2nR
′
2
⌉
i.i.d. sequences cn2 (µ2) with µ2 = (i, j) ∈ M2 × M′2
according to pC2 . Here, i represents the index of the main
message, j the index of the auxiliary message. We denote
by Cn the random variable representing the generated code
and by Cn one of its realizations.
• ncoding: If lice ants to send µ1 1 ′1, she
co putes cn1 (µ1), and trans its x
n
1 obtained by sending c
n
1
through a ith transition probability p
1|C1 .
Si ilarly, if ob ants to send µ2 2 ′2, he co putes
cn2 (µ2), and trans its x
n
2 obtained by sending c
n
2 through a
ith transition probability p
2|C2 .
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The DMCs with transition probabilities pX1|C1 and pX2|C2
are prefix channels used for simultaneous cooperative jam-
ming to confuse the eavesdropper.
• Decoding: we consider a typical set decoder.
Let us define An1, , An (X1, C2, Y1) and An2, ,
An (X2, C1, Y2).
If yn1 is received by Alice, she selects µˆ2 such that
(xn1 , c
n
2 (µˆ2) , y
n
1 ) ∈ An1,. If such a tuple exists and is
unique, output µˆ2, otherwise declare an error (µˆ2 =?).
If yn2 is received by Bob, he selects µˆ1 such that
(xn2 , c
n
1 (µˆ1) , y
n
2 ) ∈ An2,. If such a tuple exists and is
unique, output µˆ1, otherwise declare an error (µˆ1 =?).
Probability of error analysis: We study the probability of
error defined as:
Pe(Cn),P
(
(M1,M2,M
′
1,M
′
2) 6=(Mˆ1, Mˆ2, Mˆ ′1, Mˆ ′2)
∣∣∣ Cn). (5)
We are looking for conditions on rates such that this probability
of error goes to zero as n goes to infinity. We use the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1: (Probability of error) For  > 0,{
R1 +R
′
1 < I(Y2;C1|X2)
R2 +R
′
2 < I(Y1;C2|X1)
⇒ lim
n→∞E(Pe(Cn)) 6 δ(). (6)
Proof: see Appendix A.
Remark Lemma 1 gives conditions for reliable communication
regardless of the eavesdropper, which is intuitive because reliabil-
ity only depends on what is happening between the two legitimate
users. However, this differs from the proof in [7], in which
additional reliability constraints that depend on the eavesdropper
are introduced to compute the leakage.
Leakage analysis: We study the leakage defined as:
L(Cn) , I(Zn;M1M2|Cn). (7)
Lemma 2: (Leakage) For  > 0,
R′1 +R
′
2 > I(C1C2;Z)
R′1 > I(C1;Z)
R′2 > I(C2;Z)
⇒ lim
n→∞E(L(Cn)) 6 δ(). (8)
Proof: see Appendix B.
Remark To interpret this result, we need to precisely understand
the role of auxiliary messages M ′1 and M
′
2. These messages are
introduced to replace the sources of randomness and Lemma 2
gives lower bounds on the rates of these auxiliary messages. This
result is intuitive: to prevent Eve from recovering the messages,
more randomness must be introduced in the encoding process.
Lemma 2 shows that there exist minimum values of the rates
such that they allow zero asymptotical leakage.
It is important to remember that, because of the constraints
imposed by Lemma 1, increasing auxiliary message rates reduces
the amount of information one can transmit through the channel.
Code selection: By Markov’s inequality, we have
lim
n→∞P(Pe(Cn) > 3δ()) 6
1
3
,
lim
n→∞P(L(Cn) > 3δ()) 6
1
3
;
therefore, we conclude that there exists a specific sequence of
codes {Cn}n>1 such that lim
n→∞Pe(Cn) 6 δ(), and limn→∞L(Cn) 6
δ().
Remark Each code Cn consists of a pair of codes (C1, C2).
Although the codes C1 and C2 are generated according to in-
dependent distributions, note that both codes are jointly selected;
therefore, the codes are used independently by Alice and Bob but
optimized jointly to guarantee secrecy.
Conclusion: For any  > 0, there exists a code such
that the probability of error and the leakage are smaller than
δ(). Therefore, it is possible to create a sequence of codes
{Cn(n)}n>1 with n −→
n→∞ 0.
By combining the rate constraints in (6) and (8), we get the
result given in Proposition 1.
By elimination of the auxiliary rates R′1 and R
′
2, we obtain the
following region:
Corollary 1 (Strongly secure achievable region):
R =
⋃
p∈P

(
R1
R2
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R16 I(Y2;C1|X2)− I(C1;Z)
R26 I(Y1;C2|X1)− I(C2;Z)
R1 +R26 I(Y2;C1|X2) + I(Y1;C2|X1)
− I(C2C2;Z)

⊂ R¯2W, (9)
where:
P = {pX1X2C1C2Y1Y2Z factorizing as:
pY1Y2Z|X1X2 pX1|C1 pC1 pX2|C2 pC2}. (10)
Proof of Corollary 1: With (3) and (8), we have:
R1 +R
′
1 +R2 +R
′
2 6 I(Y2;C1|X2) + I(Y1;C2|X1)
R1 +R2 6 I(Y2;C1|X2) + I(Y1;C2|X1)−R′1 −R′2
R1 +R2 6 I(Y2;C1|X2) + I(Y1;C2|X1)− I(C2C2;Z).
Using (3) and (8), we also have:
R1 +R
′
1 6 I(Y2;C1|X2)
R1 6 I(Y2;C1|X2)−R′1
R1 6 I(Y2;C1|X2)− I(C1;Z).
Similarly, we have: R2 6 I(Y1;C2|X1)− I(C2;Z).
The region described in (9) is identical to the one obtained by
Tekin and Yener in [7], [8] for weak secrecy. However, a closer
look at the proof shows that their result is obtained by projecting
the region R′ defined as:
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R′ =
⋃
p∈P


R1
R2
R′1
R′2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 +R
′
16 I(Y2;C1|X2)
R2 +R
′
26 I(Y1;C2|X1)
R′1 +R
′
2 = I(C1C2;Z)
R′16 I(C1;Z|C2)
R′26 I(C2;Z|C1)
 . (11)
This region differs from the one in Proposition 1 in the constraints
on auxiliary message rates (R′1, R
′
2). The difference is shown in
Fig. 3, where the dark area corresponds to constraints (8) and
the light one to the constraints on (R′1, R
′
2) in (11). Note that the
latter corresponds to the achievable region of a multiple access
channel (MAC). This is not surprising because the proof of (11)
relies explicitly on the analysis of the probability of error for the
eavesdropper, who obtains its signal through a virtual multiple
access channel as shown in Fig. 2. In contrast, our approach
analyzes the secrecy constraint directly, which leads to lower
bounds on the auxiliary message rate required to confuse the
eavesdropper. The projection of both regions on the plane of
rates (R1, R2) is the same because it corresponds to having the
auxiliary message rates on the diagonal edge, which is common
to both. In terms of code structure, the approach of Tekin and
Yener consists in augmenting the number of auxiliary messages
until the leakage to the eavesdropper become negligible, which
only happens on the slope of the MAC region. Our constraints
directly give a region with negligible leakage and the approach
consists in finding the minimum number of auxiliary messages
needed to confuse the eavesdropper, and, therefore, augmenting
the number of secret messages to the maximum possible value.
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R￿ =
￿
p∈P


R1
R2
R￿1
R￿2

￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
R1 +R
￿
1￿ I(Y2;C1|X2)
R2 +R
￿
2￿ I(Y1;C2|X1)
R￿1 +R
￿
2= I(C1C2;Z)
R￿1￿ I(C1;Z|C2)
R￿2￿ I(C2;Z|C1)
 . (11)
This region differs from the one in Proposition 1 in the constraints
on auxiliary message rates (R￿1, R
￿
2). The difference is shown in
Fig. 3, where the dark area corresponds to constraints (8) and the
light one to the constraints on (R￿1, R
￿
2) in (11). Note that the
latter corresponds to the achievable region of a multiple access
channel (MAC). This is not surprising because the proof of (11)
relies explicitly on the analysis of the probability of error for the
eavesdropper, who obtains its signal through a virtual multiple
access channel as shown in Fig. 2. In contrast, our approach
analyzes the secrecy constraint directly, which leads to lower
bounds on the auxiliary message rate required to confuse the
eavesdropper. The projection of both regions on the plane of
rates (R1, R2) is the same because it corresponds to having the
auxiliary message rates on the diagonal edge, which is common
to both. In terms of code structure, the approach of Tekin &
Yener consists in augmenting the number of auxiliary messages
until the leakage to the eavesdropper become negligible, which
only happens on the slope of the MAC region. Our constraints
directly give a region with negligible leakage and the approach
consists in finding the minimum number of auxiliary messages
needed to confuse the eavesdropper, and, therefore, augmenting
the number of secret messages to the maximum possible value.
R￿1
I(C2;Z|C1)
I(C1, C2;Z)
R￿2
I(C1, C2;Z)I(C1;Z)
I(C2;Z)
I(C1;Z|C2)
L(C) =
n∞ 0
MAC
Fig. 3. Constraints on R￿1 and R
￿
2 in (8) and (11)
IV. KEY EXCHANGE AND KEY GENERATION
In the previous section, we have exploited the benefits of coded
cooperative jamming and simultaneous cooperative jamming, but
we did not exploit the possibility of feedback. We introduce
feedback with two mechanisms:
• we use the technique of [9] and [11] to transfer secret rate
from one user to the other;
• we use the randomness introduced by cooperative jamming
to induce a source from which we generate secret keys.
Note that we can only exchange information through a rate-
limited channel; therefore, we rely on results for secret
key agreement with rate-limited public communication [16],
[17].
A. Key Exchange
We introduce key exchange on top of the cooperative jamming
scheme introduced in Section III by splitting the main and auxil-
iary messages into multiple parts. We use these sub-messages as
a means to exchange a key using the secret channel and encrypt
part of the public message. Because of the “secret rate transfer”
we need to redefine which rates we are considering.
Let us consider a code for cooperative jamming with secret
message rates (R1, R2) and auxiliary messages rates (R￿1, R
￿
2).
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we split the main message Mi into two parts:
• A key, which is used for encryption by the other user: Ki ∈
Ki =
￿
1, 2nR
k
i
￿
; user i needs to sacrifice a part of its secret
message to transmit this key.
• A secret message: Si ∈ Si =
￿
1, 2nR
s
i
￿
; this part corre-
sponds to the part of secret message user i does not sacrifice.
We also split the auxiliary message M ￿i in two parts:
• A message Ei, which is encrypted with the key sent by the
other user to give E¯i ∈ Ei =
￿
1, 2nR
e
i
￿
. Encryption is done
with a one-time pad to ensure perfect secrecy [25].
• An open message: Oi ∈ Oi =
￿
1, 2nR
o
i
￿
; this corresponds to
the part of the message that remains public and still perfectly
decodable by the receiver.
By convention, if no key is available Rei = 0, else, by
construction, Re1 ￿ Rk2, Re2 ￿ Rk1. We denote: Mi = Si × Ki,
M￿i = Oi × Ei. Therefore, we have the following relationships
between the various rates:
R1 = R
s
1 +R
k
1, R2 = R
s
2 +R
k
2,
R￿1 = R
o
1 +R
e
1, R
￿
2 = R
o
2 +R
e
2. (12)
Although (R1, R2, R￿1, R
￿
2) still represents the rates provided
by cooperative jamming, they are no longer the rates of interest
after key exchange. In fact, part of the auxiliary message is
encrypted while part of the secret message is sacrificed to
exchange a key. Hence, the rates we need to consider are the
following:
• a pair of secret rates: R˜1 = Rs1 +R
e
1, and R˜2 = R
s
2 +R
e
2;
• a pair of public rates: R˜￿1 = R
o
1, and R˜
￿
2 = R
o
2.
Remark Because the key sent by one user cannot be used
simultaneously by the other, the key exchange scheme must
operate in several rounds. At each round, we use the key sent
in the previous one, except in the first round where no key is
available. If we use a code of length n B times, we obtain a
new code of length n￿ = Bn; the first message does not use key
exchange, but the next B − 1 do. If the communication rate for
the first message is R∗, for the B − 1 others it is R, and the
overall rate is R¯, we have:
R¯ =
nR∗ + n(B − 1)R
nB
=
B→∞
R.
Thus, the first round incurs a negligible rate penalty for B going
to infinity.
Fig. 3. Constraints on R′1 and R
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In the previous section, we have exploited the benefits of coded
cooperative jamming and simultaneous cooperative jamming, but
we did not exploit the possibility of feedback. We introduce
feedback with two mechanisms:
• we use the technique of [9] and [11] to transfer secret rate
from one user to the other;
• we use the randomness introduced by cooperative jamming
to induce a source from which we generate secret keys.
Note that we can only exchange information through a rate-
limited channel; therefore, we rely on results for secret
key agreement with rate-limited public communication [16],
[17].
A. Key Exchange
We introduce key exchange on top of the cooperative jamming
scheme introduced in Section III by splitting the main and auxil-
iary messages into multiple parts. We use these sub-messages as
a means to exchange a key using the secret channel and encrypt
part of the public message. Because of the “secret rate transfer”
we need to redefine which rates we are considering.
Let us consider a code for cooperative jamming with secret
message rates (R1, R2) and auxiliary messages rates (R′1, R
′
2).
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we split the main message Mi into two parts:
• A key, which is used for encryption by the other user: Ki ∈
Ki =
q
1, 2nR
k
i
y
; user i needs to sacrifice a part of its secret
message to transmit this key.
• A secret message: Si ∈ Si =
q
1, 2nR
s
i
y
; this part corre-
sponds to the part of secret message user i does not sacrifice.
We also split the auxiliary message M ′i in two parts:
• A message Ei, which is encrypted with the key sent by the
other user to give E¯i ∈ Ei =
q
1, 2nR
e
i
y
. Encryption is done
with a one-time pad to ensure perfect secrecy [25].
• An open message: Oi ∈ Oi =
q
1, 2nR
o
i
y
; this corresponds to
the part of the message that remains public and still perfectly
decodable by the receiver.
By convention, if no key is available Rei = 0, else, by
construction, Re1 6 Rk2, Re2 6 Rk1. We denote: Mi = Si × Ki,
M′i = Oi × Ei. Therefore, we have the following relationships
between the various rates:
R1 = R
s
1 +R
k
1, R2 = R
s
2 +R
k
2,
R′1 = R
o
1 +R
e
1, R
′
2 = R
o
2 +R
e
2. (12)
Although (R1, R2, R′1, R
′
2) still represents the rates provided
by cooperative jamming, they are no longer the rates of interest
after key exchange. In fact, part of the auxiliary message is
encrypted while part of the secret message is sacrificed to
exchange a key. Hence, the rates we need to consider are the
following:
• a pair of secret rates: R˜1 = Rs1 +R
e
1, and R˜2 = R
s
2 +R
e
2;
• a pair of public rates: R˜′1 = R
o
1, and R˜
′
2 = R
o
2.
Remark Because the key sent by one user cannot be used
simultaneously by the other, the key exchange scheme must
operate in several rounds. At each round, we use the key sent
in the previous one, except in the first round where no key is
available. If we use a code of length n B times, we obtain a
new code of length n′ = Bn; the first message does not use key
exchange, but the next B − 1 do. If the communication rate for
the first message is R∗, for the B − 1 others it is R, and the
overall rate is R¯, we have:
R¯ =
nR∗ + n(B − 1)R
nB
=
B→∞
R.
Thus, the first round incurs a negligible rate penalty for B going
to infinity.
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For weak secrecy, [11] proves the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (El Gamal et al.):
RF =
⋃
p∈P


R1
R2
R′1
R′2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R16 I(Y2;C1|X2)
R26 I(Y1;C2|X1)
R1 +R26 I(Y2;C1|X2) + I(Y1;C2|X1)
− I(C2C2;Z)

⊆ R2W, (13)
where:
P = {pX1X2C1C2Y1Y2Z factorizing as:
pY1Y2ZX1X2 pX1|C1 pC1 pX2|C2 pC2}. (14)
Based on Section III, we also have this result for strong secrecy:
RF ⊂ R¯2W.
Remark By comparing (9) and (13), we see that key exchange
improves the individual bounds on R1 and R2, but not the
bound on the sum-rate. Individual bounds on R1 and R2 actually
correspond to the capacity of the channel between the two users
and cannot be improved; therefore, any improvement on the
region should modify the sum-rate constraint.
B. Key Generation from Induced Source
Key exchange requires sacrificing part of the secret rate of one
user. In addition, we can use the channel randomness introduced
for simultaneous cooperative jamming to extract secret keys.
Although users must exchange additional messages to agree on
a common secret key, key generation only comes at the expense
of public message rate.
In the next section, we study the Gaussian two-way wiretap
channel and we explicitly show how cooperative jamming induces
a discrete memoryless source (DMS)
(
X˜, Y˜ , Z˜
)
independent of
all other observations, which can be used to distill a secret key.
The existence of this DMS is not obvious because the noise
introduced by cooperative jamming is already exploited to harm
the eavesdropper and it is a priori unclear if it could be used
simultaneously as a source of common randomness for secret-
key agreement. We start by clarifying what knowledge of the
eavesdropper needs to be considered to identify the DMS. Let K
be the secret key to generate and let M1, M2, M ′1 and M
′
2 be the
secret and auxiliary messages used in the cooperative jamming
code. The key and secret messages must be independent and
both must be hidden from the eavesdropper, that is for  > 0,
I(M1M2K;Zn) 6 . Notice that
I(M1M2K;Zn) = I(M1M2;Zn) + I(K;Zn|M1M2)
= I(M1M2;Zn) + I(K;ZnM1M2).
The term I(M1M2;Zn) can be smaller than /2 by construction
of the cooperative jamming code but note that we must then have
I(K;ZnM1M2) 6 /2; this means that the key must be hidden
from an eavesdropper having access not only to the observation
Zn but also to the secret messages M1 and M2. Furthermore,
note that
I(M1M2K;Zn)
= I(M1M2;Zn) + I(K;ZnM1M2M ′1M ′2)
− I(K;M ′1M ′2|ZnM1M2).
If the cooperative jamming code is chosen to provide the highest
secrecy rate, the public message rates must be chosen to lie on
the boundary of the region in (9), for which [7], [8] shows that
H(M ′1M ′2|ZnM1M2) 6 /2. In this case, we obtain:
I(M1M2K;Zn) > I(M1M2;Zn)
+ I(K;ZnM1M2M ′1M ′2)−

2
In other words, we can assume that the key K must be kept secret
from an eavesdropper observing not only the channel output Zn
but also knowing the secret and auxiliary messages transmitted
by the legitimate users.
C. Achievable region with key exchange and key generation
In this section, we provide a generic strategy and an achiev-
able region based on cooperative jamming, key exchange and
key generation. We assume the existence of a DMS (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜)
independent of all other observations induced by cooperative
jamming. The statistics of the DMS depend both on channel
statistics and the code used for communications, but we do not
attempt to characterize them exactly.
First, note that substituting the rates defined in (12) in Proposi-
tion 1 gives a set of constraints that achievable rates must satisfy:
Rs1 +R
k
1 +R
o
1 +R
e
1 6 I(Y2;C1|X2) (15)
Rs2 +R
k
2 +R
o
2 +R
e
2 6 I(Y1;C2|X1) (16)
Ro1 +R
e
1 +R
o
2 +R
e
2 > I(C1C2;Z) (17)
Ro1 +R
e
1 > I(C1;Z) (18)
Ro2 +R
e
2 > I(C2;Z). (19)
In order to add a key generation step, we need to further split
message rates in multiple parts. For instance, Alice modifies her
rates as follows:
• R˜s1 = R
s
1. Secret key generation does not change anything
for the secret message rate.
• R˜k1 = R
k
1. Secret key generation does not change anything
for the secret key rate used for key exchange.
• R˜o1 = R
o
1 − R¯p1 − R¯e1. A part R¯p1 of the open message rate
is used for secret-key generation while a part R¯e1 is used to
transmit an encrypted message with that same key. Notice
that the constraint Ro1 > R¯
p
1 + R¯
e
1 must be satisfied.
• R˜e1 = R
e
1 + R¯
e
1. Thanks to key generation the encrypted
message rate increases.
Alice’s total secure communication rate is then R˜s1 + R˜
e
1. Bob
modifies his rates in a similar way.
Even if the DMS was characterized exactly, the secret-key
capacity of a source with rate-limited public communication is
not known. Therefore, we focus on a suboptimal key agreement
strategy in which a single user sacrifices a fraction R¯p of its
open message rate for communication and a single user uses the
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secret-key generated from the source for encryption. In this case,
the optimal key generation rate R¯k that can be distilled with rate-
limited public communication is known [16, Theorem 2.6]:
R¯k < I
(
V ; X˜|U
)
− I
(
V ; Z˜|U
)
,
where the random variables U and V are such that U ↔ V ↔
Y˜ ↔ X˜Z˜ forms a Markov chain and
I
(
V ; Y˜
)
− I
(
V ; X˜
)
6 R¯p.
Depending on which user performs public discussion and which
user encrypts a message we obtain additional constraints on R¯p
and R¯k. Specifically, we have four possible configurations given
in Table I.
hhhhhhhhhhhencryption
public com. Alice Bob
Alice: R¯e1 = R¯
k
1, R¯
k
2 = 0 R¯
p
1 + R¯
k
1 6 Ro1
{
R¯
p
1 6 Ro2
R¯k1 6 Ro1
Bob: R¯e2 = R¯
k
2, R¯
k
1 = 0
{
R¯
p
2 6 Ro1
R¯k2 6 Ro2
R¯
p
2 + R¯
k
2 6 Ro2
TABLE I
ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR KEY GENERATION
Although we do not attempt to obtain a closed-form expression,
note that key generation can loosen the sum-rate constraint
in (13).
V. GAUSSIAN TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we evaluate an achievable region based on the
strategies developed in previous sections. We consider a Gaussian
two-way wiretap channel for which the relationships between
inputs and outputs are:
Y n1 =
√
g1X
n
1 +X
n
2 +N
n
21
Y n2 = X
n
1 +
√
g2X
n
2 +N
n
12
Zn =
√
h1X
n
1 +
√
h2X
n
2 +N
n
e .
(20)
In addition the inputs are subject to the power constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
((
X
(i)
1
)2)
6 ρ1 and
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
((
X
(i)
2
)2)
6 ρ2.
We suppose the additive noises Nn21, N
n
12, and N
n
e are i.i.d. zero-
mean unit-variance Gaussian vectors. We implement cooperative
jamming by prefixing an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel before each input of WTC2. This is equivalent to
considering a modified channel with inputs C1 and C2, with:
Xn1 = C
n
1 +N
n
11 and X
n
2 = C
n
2 +N
n
22, (21)
where Nn11 ∼ N (0, ρn1 In) and Nn22 ∼ N (0, ρn2 In) correspond to
the noise introduced by users to realize cooperative jamming. We
suppose ρn1 6 ρ1 and ρn2 6 ρ2, and obtain the modified power
constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
((
C
(i)
k
)2)
6 ρk − ρnk = ρck, k = 1, 2.
With minor modifications of the proof of Section III to account
for the power constraints, we obtain an achievable region for the
Gaussian two-way wiretap channel by substituting the random
variables C1 ∼ N (0, ρc1) and C2 ∼ N (0, ρc2) in the bounds
obtained earlier.
A. Randomness Source Extraction
We provide an explicit characterization of the DMS induced
by cooperative jamming, which we will use to extract a key later
on. Define:
X˜1 = N11 Y˜1 = X˜2 +N21 Z˜ =
√
h1 X˜1 +
√
h2 X˜2 +Ne.X˜2 = N22 Y˜2 = X˜1 +N12
(22)
Proposition 3: The triple (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜) with X˜ = (X˜1, Y˜1) and
Y˜ = (X˜2, Y˜2) is an independent DMS that can be used for key
generation. Alice, Bob and Eve observe the components X˜ , Y˜ ,
and Z˜, respectively.
Proof: Since Alice generates the noise N11, she obtains X˜1
directly. She also observes the channel output Y n1 = C
n
2 +N
n
22 +
Nn21 +
√
g1X
n
1 ; since she knows X
n
1 and can decode C
n
2 with
high probability, she can obtain Y˜1. Similarly, Bob can obtain X˜2
and Y˜2.
Eve observes the channel output Zn =
√
h1X
n
1 +
√
h2X
n
2 +N
n
e
and, as discussed in Section IV, we assume she obtains Cn1 and
Cn2 as side-information. Therefore, Eve can compute Z˜, but we
also need to show that Z˜n is a sufficient statistic for X˜n and Y˜ n
given (Zn, Cn1 , C
n
2 ). This is the case because:
H(X˜n, Y˜ n|ZnCn1 Cn2 )
(a)
= H(X˜n, Y˜ n|Z˜nCn1 Cn2 )
(b)
= H(X˜n, Y˜ n|Z˜n)
because (a): ZC1C2 7→ Z˜C1C2 is bijective, and (b): (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜)
is independent of (C1, C2).
The DMS (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜) is a vector source, and we do not have
a closed-form expression for the secret key capacity with rate
limited public-rate communication. However, if Alice and Bob
ignore one of their observations, the DMS reduces to a degraded
scalar source. By [17, Corollary 2], there exists a function f
with closed-form expression such that:
• If Alice ignores Y˜1 and Bob ignores X˜2, we have Y˜2 ↔
X˜1 ↔ Z˜. In this case, if Bob sends public messages at rate
R¯p, Alice and Bob can distill a key at rate R¯k, such that
R¯k 6 f
(
R¯p, pY˜2X˜1Z˜
)
.
• If Bob ignores Y˜2 and Alice ignores X˜1, we have Y˜1 ↔
X˜2 ↔ Z˜. In this case, if Alice sends public messages at
rate R¯p, Alice and Bob can distill a key at rate R¯k, such
that R¯k 6 f
(
R¯p, pY˜1X˜2Z˜
)
.
With the explicit characterization of the DMS induced by
cooperative jamming and the function f , it is possible to compute
new achievable rates for the strategy described in Section IV.
Although we do not have a closed-form expression for the
resulting region R¯K, it is possible to prove that the region strictly
includes the region R¯F in Proposition 2 strengthened for strong
secrecy.
Proposition 4: Let us consider R¯F, R¯K, and R¯2W defined as
before. In general: R¯F ⊆ R¯K ⊆ R¯2W. There exists channels
such that R¯F ( R¯K.
Proof: The first statement follows directly from the definition
of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second
statement, consider the example of a channel for which:
0 < ρ1 <
h2 − 1
h1
and 0 < ρ2 <
h1 − 1
h2
.
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Fig. 4. Region evaluation for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, and
g1 = g2 = 1
Proof: The first statement follows directly from the definition
of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second
statement, consider the example of a channel for which:
0 < ρ1 <
h2 − 1
h1
and 0 < ρ2 <
h1 − 1
h2
.
In this case I(C1;Y2|X2) < I(C1;Z) and I(C2;Y1|X1) <
I(C2;Z), and the region R¯F is empty. However, since the power
constraints are non-zero, a fraction of the power can be used to
induce a DMS while still maintaining a positive auxiliary message
rate. By [17, Theorem 3], it is possible to obtain a non-zero key
rate and, therefore, a non-zero secure communication rate.
Remark Although we only prove R¯F ￿ R¯K by exhibiting a
dummy example, our numerical results in the next section clearly
show improvements in various cases.
B. Numerical results
We first consider a situation in which secret key generation
provides little gain because cooperative jamming leaves little
room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K
obtained for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, and
g1 = g2 = 1. The upper left corner of the region corresponds
to a situation in which Alice uses all her power to jam (ρn1 = ρ1)
while Bob uses all his power to transmit (ρc2 = ρ2). A secret
key can be extracted from the DMS induced by Alice; however,
since h1 = 10, Eve’s source observation is highly correlated to
Alice’s, which severely limits key rates. The upper right corner
of the region corresponds to a situation in which both Alice and
Bob use their entire power to transmit (i.e. ρc1 = ρ1 and ρ
c
2 = ρ2)
and, therefore, no DMS is induced. For comparison, we also plot
the region R¯ obtained using key generation alone (no cooperative
jamming). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that
there exist practical coding schemes for key generation over
Gaussian channel; therefore, the region R¯ provides an estimate of
rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known
outer region R¯out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by
He & Yener [26].
Fig. 5 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for ρ1 = ρ2 = 1,
h1 = h2 = 1.5, and g1 = g2 = 1. This corresponds to a situation
Fig. 5. Region evaluation for ρ1= ρ2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 1.5, g1 = g2 = 1
Fig. 6. Region evaluation for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, g1 = g2 = 1
in which Eve obtains a better observation than either Alice and
Bob and in which Alice and Bob have little power available. In
such a case, key generation provides a significant improvement.
Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, and g1 = g2 = 1. In this case
R¯F = ∅, but key generation is possible. This case corresponds
to the situation used in the proof of Proposition 4.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have developed an achievable region of
strongly secure rates based on strategies that partially decouple
the use of interference and feedback for secrecy. We have first
exploited interference by using a cooperative jamming strategy
on top of which we have introduced some basic feedback
mechanisms. We have relied on key exchange to transfer secure
rate between users and we have performed key generation to
distill secret keys from the noise sources induced by cooperative
jamming. Numerical results in the Gaussian case have shown
significant improvement in some cases.
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions.
First, note that the key generation process we considered is
based on one-way communication between the two users. There
exist sources for which two-way communication is provably
better than one-way communication [3]; we can exhibit a wiretap
Fig. 4. Region evaluation for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, and
g1 = g2 = 1
In this case I(C1;Y2|X2) < I(C1;Z) and I(C2;Y1|X1) <
I(C2;Z), and the region R¯F is empty. However, since the power
constraints are non-zero, a fraction of the power can be used to
induce a DMS while still maintaining a positive auxiliary message
rate. By [17, Theorem 3], it is possible to obtain a non-zero key
rate and, therefore, a non-zero secure communication rate.
Remark Although we only prove R¯F ( R¯K by exhibiting a
dummy example, our numerical results in the next section clearly
show improvements in various cases.
B. Numerical results
We first consider a situation in which secret key generation
provides little gain because cooperative jamming leaves little
room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K
obtained for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, and
g1 = g2 = 1. The upper left corner of the region corresponds
to a situation in which Alice uses all her power to jam (ρn1 = ρ1)
while Bob uses all his power to transmit (ρc2 = ρ2). A secret
key can be extracted from the DMS induced by Alice; however,
since h1 = 10, Eve’s source observation is highly correlated to
Alice’s, which severely limits key rates. The upper right corner
of the region corresponds to a situation in which both Alice and
Bob use their entire power to transmit (i.e. ρc1 = ρ1 and ρ
c
2 = ρ2)
and, therefore, no DMS is induced. For comparison, we also plot
the region R¯ obtained using key generation alone (no cooperative
jamming). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that
there exist practical coding schemes for key generation over
Gaussian channel; therefore, the region R¯ provides an estimate of
rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known
outer region R¯out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by
He and Yener [26].
Fig. 5 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for ρ1 = ρ2 = 1,
h1 = h2 = 1.5, and g1 = g2 = 1. This corresponds to a situation
in which Eve obtains a better observation than either Alice and
Bob and in which Alice and Bob have little power available. In
such a case, key generation provides a significant improvement.
Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, and g1 = g2 = 1. In this case
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Fig. 4. Region evalu tion for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, and
g1 = g2 = 1
Proof: The first atement follows directly from the definition
of the key gen ration strategy in Section IV. For the second
statement, consider the xample of a channel for which:
0 < ρ1 <
h2 − 1
h1
and 0 < ρ2 <
h1 − 1
h2
.
In this case I(C1;Y2|X2) < I(C1;Z) and I(C2;Y1|X1) <
I(C2;Z), and the region R¯F is empty. Howev r, since the power
constraints are no -zero, a fraction of the power can be used to
induce a DMS while still maintaini g a positive auxiliary message
rate. By [17, Theorem 3], it s possible to btain a no -zero key
rate and, ther fore, a no -zero secure com unication rate.
Remark Although we only prove R¯F ￿ R¯K by exhibiting a
dum y example, our numerical results in the next section clearly
show improvements in various case .
B. Numerical results
We first consider a situation in which secret key gen ration
provides little gain because cooperative jam ing leaves little
room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K
obtained for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, and
g1 = g2 = 1. The upper left corner of the region corresponds
to a situation in which Alice use all her power to jam (ρn1 = ρ1)
while Bob use all his power to transmit (ρc2 = ρ2). A secret
key can be xtracted from the DMS induced by Alice; howev r,
since h1 = 10, Eve’s ource observation is highly correlated to
Alice’s, which sev r ly limits key rates. The upper right corner
of the region corresponds to a situation in which both Alice and
Bob use their entire power to transmit (i.e. ρc1 = ρ1 and ρ
c
2 = ρ2)
and, ther fore, no DMS is nduced. For comparison, we also plot
the region R¯ obtained using key gen ration alone (no cooperative
jam ing). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that
ther xist practi al coding schemes for key gen ration over
Gaussian channel; ther fore, the region R¯ provides an estimate of
rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known
outer region R¯out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by
He & Yen r [26].
Fig. 5 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for ρ1 = ρ2 = 1,
h1 = h2 = 1.5, and g1 = g2 = 1. This corresponds to a situation
Fig. 5 Region evalu tion for ρ1= ρ2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 1.5, g1 = g2 = 1
Fig. 6 Region evalu tion for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, g1 = g2 = 1
in which Eve obtains a bett r observation than either Alice and
Bob and in which Alice and Bob have little power av il ble. In
such a case, key gen ration provides a significant improvement.
Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, and g1 = g2 = 1. In this case
R¯F = ∅, but key gen ration is possible. This case corresponds
to the situation used in the proof of Prop sition 4.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this pa er, we have dev loped an achievable region of
strongly secure rates based on strategies that partially decouple
the use of interfer nce and feedback for secrecy. We have first
exploited interfer nce by using a cooperative jam ing strategy
on top of which we have introduced some basic feedback
mechanisms. We have reli d on key exchange to transfer secure
rate between users and we have performed key gen ration to
distill secret keys from the noise sources induced by cooperative
jam ing. Numerical results in the Gaussian case have shown
significant improvement in some case .
Our esults can aturally be xtende in sev ral directions.
First, note that the key gen ration process we considered is
based on one-way com unication between the two users. There
exist sources for which two-way com unication is provably
bett r than one-way com unication [3]; we can exhibit a wiretap
Fig. 5. egion evaluation for ρ1= ρ2 = 1, h = h2 = 1.5, g1 = g2 = 1
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Fig. 4. Region evaluation for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 10 , h1 = 1, h2 0.1,
g1 = g2 = 1
Proof: The first statement follows directly from the definition
of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second
statement, consider the example of a channel for which:
0 < ρ1 <
h2 − 1
h1
and 0 < ρ2 <
h1 − 1
h2
.
In this case I(C1;Y2|X2) < I(C1;Z) and I(C2;Y1|X1) <
I(C2;Z), and the region R¯F is empty. However, since the power
constraints are non-zero, a fraction of the power can be used to
induce a DMS while still maintaining a positive auxiliary message
rate. By [17, Theorem 3], it is possible to obtain a non-zero key
rate and, therefo , a non-zero secure communication rate.
Remark Although we only prove R¯F ￿ R¯K by exhibiting a
dummy xample, our numerical results in the next section clearly
show improvements in various cases.
B. Numerical results
We first consider a situation in which secret key generation
provides little gain because cooperative jamming l aves little
room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the re ion R¯F and R¯K
obtain d for ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100, h1 = 1, h2 = 0.1, a d
g1 = g2 = 1. The u per left corner f the region corresponds
to a sit ation n which Alice uses all her power to jam (ρn1 1
while Bob uses all his power to transmit (ρc2 = ρ2). A secre
key can be extracted from the DMS induced by Alice; however,
since h1 = 10, Eve’s source observation is highly correlat d to
Alice’s, which severely limits key rates. The upper right corner
of the region corresponds to a situation in which both Alice and
Bob use their entire power to transmit (i.e. ρc1 = ρ1 and ρ
c
2 = ρ2)
and, therefore, no DMS is induced. For comparison, we also plot
the region R¯ obtained using key generation alone (no cooperative
jamming). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that
there exist practical coding schemes for key generation over
Gaussian channel; therefore, the region R¯ provides an estimate of
rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known
outer region R¯out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by
He & Yener [26].
Fig. 5 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for ρ1 = ρ2 = 1,
h1 = h2 = 1.5, and g1 = g2 = 1. This corresponds to a situation
i . . R i e aluation for ρ1= ρ2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 1.5, g1 = g2 = 1
Fig. 6. Region evaluation for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, g1 = g2 = 1
in which Eve obtains a better observation than either Alice and
Bob and in which Alice and Bob have little power available. In
such a case, key generation provides a significant improvement.
Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates the region R¯F and R¯K obtained for
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, and g1 = g2 = 1. In this case
R¯F = ∅, but key generation is possible. This case corresponds
to the situation used in the proof of Proposition 4.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have developed an achievable region of
strongly secure rates based on strategies that partially decouple
the use of interference and feedback for secrecy. We have first
exploited interference by using a cooperative jamming strategy
on top of which we have introduced some basic feedback
mechanisms. We have relied on key exchange to transfer secure
rate between users and we have performed key generation to
distill secret keys from the noise sources induced by cooperative
jamming. Numerical results in the Gaussian case have shown
significant improvement in some cases.
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions.
First, note that the key generation process we considered is
based on one-way communication between the two users. There
exist sources for which two-way communication is provably
better than one-way communication [3]; we can exhibit a wiretap
Fig. 6. egion evaluation for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.9, h1 = h2 = 10, g1 = g2 = 1
R¯F = ∅, but key generation is possible. This case corresponds
to the situation used in the proof of Proposition 4.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PE SPECTIVES
In this paper, we have develope an achievable region of
strongly sec re rates bas d on trateg es that partially decouple
he use of interfer nce a d feedback or secrecy. We have first
exploited interference by using a cooperative jamming strategy
on top of which we have introduced some basic feedback
mechani ms. We have reli d on key xchange to transfe secure
rate between users and we have performed key generation to
distill secret k ys from the nois sources indu ed by cooperative
jamming. Numerical results in the Gaussian case have shown
significant improvement in some cases.
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions.
First, note that the key generation process we considered is
based on one-way communication between the two users. There
exist sources for which two-way communication is provably
better than one-way communication [3]; we can exhibit a wiretap
channel based on those sources for which the same result would
hold. Second, we can extend the Gaussian two-way wiretap
channel to multiple antennas by relying on the results of Khisti
and Wornell [27] and Oggier and Hassibi [28] for the MIMO
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wiretap channel, and Watanabe and Oohama [17] for secret key
agreement from vector sources. Third, we could generalize our
results to more than two legitimate users. While this poses no
major conceptual problem, generalizing Lemma 2 might not be
so straightforward. Fourth, the results obtained for the Gaussian
case rely on an explicit characterization of the DMS induced
by cooperative jamming; it would be interesting to generalize
the approach beyond channels with an additive noise structure.
Finally, our results generalize to known channels with memory,
such as wireless channels with ergodic fading [29], [30], by using
the general result of Steinberg on channel resolvability for the
multiple-access channel [19].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let us define: M1 ,
⌈
2nR1
⌉
, M2 ,
⌈
2nR2
⌉
, M′1 ,
⌈
2nR
′
1
⌉
and M′2 ,
⌈
2nR
′
2
⌉
, and let C be the random variable representing
a randomly generated code. Let1  > 0.
We show that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our
attention to the transmission of a single message:
E(Pe(C)) = E
 ∑
µ1∈M1×M′1
µ2∈M2×M′2
Pe(C|µ1, µ2 sent)P(µ1, µ2 sent)

=
∑
µ1∈M1×M′1
µ2∈M2×M′2
P(µ1, µ2 sent)EC(Pe(C|µ1, µ2 sent))︸ ︷︷ ︸
EC(Pe(C|1,1 sent))
(a)
= E(Pe(C|1, 1 sent))
(b)
6 E(P(µ1 6= µˆ1|1, 1 sent, C))
+ E(P(µ2 6= µˆ2|1, 1 sent, C)). (23)
Equality (a) follows from the symmetry of the random code
construction, while inequality (b) is given by the union bound.
Each term can be expressed using the following events:
• E(i, j) = {(Xn1 , Cn2 (i, j), Y n1 ) ∈ An1,}
• F(i, j) = {(Xn2 , Cn1 (i, j), Y n2 ) ∈ An2,}
Now, we compute:
E(P(µ2 6= µˆ2|1, 1 sent, C))
= P
(
Ec(1, 1) ∨
∨
(i,j)6=1
E(i, j)
)
6 P(Ec(1, 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
6δ()
+
∑
(i,j) 6=1
P(E(i, j))
6 δ() +
∑
(i,j)6=1
∑
(xn1 ,c
n
2 ,y
n
1 )∈An1,
pXn1 Y n1 (x
n
1 , c
n
1 )pCn2 (c
n
2 )
6 δ() +M2M ′2︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 exp2(n(R2 + R′2 + δ(n)))
exp2(n(H(X1C2Y1) + ))
exp2(−n(H(C2)− )) · exp2(−n(H(X1Y1)− ))
= δ() + exp2(n(R2 +R
′
2 − I(C2;Y1|X1) + δ(n) + 3)).
(24)
The second inequality follows from the union bound, and the
penultimate from the AEP.
If the rate constraints in (6) are satisfied, there exists a γ > 0
such that R2 +R′2 < I(Y1;C2|X1)−γ, and choosing  such that
γ + 3 > 0, we obtain:
lim
n→∞EC(P(µ2 6= µˆ2|1, 1 sent, C)) 6 δ().
By symmetry, we obtain, by a similar reasoning on F :
lim
n→∞EC(P(µ1 6= µˆ1|1, 1 sent, C)) 6 δ().
Therefore: lim
n→∞E(Pe(C)) 6 δ(). QED
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let1  > 0.
An upper bound for the leakage using divergence:
L(C) , I(Zn;M1M2|C) (25)
= D
(
pM1M2Zn|C‖pM1M2|CpZn|C
)
=
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
∑
zn∈Zn
pM1M2Zn|C(m1,m2, z
n)
log2
pM1M2Zn|C(m1,m2, z
n)
pM1M2|C(m1,m2)pZn|C(zn)
=
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
∑
zn∈Zn
pZn|M1M2,C(z
n|m1,m2)
pM1M2(m1,m2) log2
pZn|M1M2,C(z
n|m1,m2)
pZn|C(zn)
=
1
M1M2
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
D
(
pZn|m1,m2,C‖pZn|C
)
6 1
M1M2
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
D
(
pZn|m1,m2,C‖pZn|C
)
+ D
(
pZn|C‖pZn
)
because: D(·‖·) < 0
=
1
M1M2
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
D
(
pZn|m1,m2,C‖pZn
)
. (26)
Taking the expectation and using the symmetry of the random
code construction, yields:
EC(L(C)) = I(Zn;M1M2|C)
6 1
M1M2
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
EC
(
D
(
pZn|m1,m2,C‖pZn
))
= EC
(
D
(
pZn|1,1,C‖pZn
))
. (27)
1For convenience we shall add extra conditions on  as needed.
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An upper bound for the divergence: :
D(pZn|1,1,C‖pZn)
=
∑
zn∈Zn
pZn|1,1,C(zn) log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
=
∑
zn∈Zn
pZn|1,1,C(zn) log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
1
{
log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
6 
}
+
∑
zn∈Zn
pZn|1,1,C(zn) log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
1
{
log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
> 
}
6 +
∑
zn∈Zn
pZn|1,1,C(zn) log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
1
{
log2
pZn|1,1,C(zn)
pZn(zn)
> 
}
. (28)
By the law of total probability:
pZn(z
n)
=
∑
cn1∈Cn1
∑
cn2∈Cn2
pZn|Cn1 Cn2 (z
n|cn1 , cn2 ) pCn1 (cn1 ) pCn2 (cn2 )
>
∑
cn1∈B1(1)
∑
cn2∈B2(1)
pZn|Cn1 Cn2 (z
n|cn1 , cn2 ) pCn1 (cn1 ) pCn2 (cn2 )
> M′1M′2pnmin1p
n
min2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pnmin
pZn|1,1,C(zn) ,
where Bi(m), for i ∈ {1, 2}, represents the set of codewords
associated with message m for user i. To obtain the last inequal-
ity, the p.d.f. of C1 and C2 must have compact support, which
can always be obtained by cropping (to get a compact support)
and scaling (to keep an unit area) the p.d.f. If Cˇ1 and Cˇ2 are
derived from C1 and C2 with discrete or Gaussian p.d.f., it is
possible to get V
(
pC1 , pCˇ1
)
and V
(
pC2 , pCˇ2
)
as small as we
want. Since I(X;Y ) viewed as a function of pX , with pY |X
fixed, is continuous, the mutual informations involved in (8) are
hardly modified by using Cˇ1 and Cˇ2 instead of C1 and C2.
By taking the expectation of (28) and with [19], we have:
EC(L(C)) = I(Zn;M1M2|C) 6 + n log2
(
1
pmin
)
J, (29)
where J is defined as:
J ,∑
c
(2)
1 ∈Cn1
· · ·
∑
c
(M′1)
1 ∈Cn1
∑
c
(2)
2 ∈Cn2
· · ·
∑
c
(M′2)
2 ∈Cn2
pCn1
(
c
(2)
1
)
· · · pCn1
(
c
(M′1)
1
)
pCn2
(
c
(2)
2
)
· · · pCn2
(
c
(M′2)
2
)
×
∑
c
(1)
1 ∈Cn1
∑
c
(1)
2 ∈Cn2
∑
zn∈Zn
pCn1 Cn2 Zn
(
c
(1)
1 , c
(1)
2 , z
n
)
× 1
{
1
M′1M
′
2
exp2
(
iCn1 Cn2 ;Zn
(
c
(1)
1 , c
(1)
2 ; z
n
))
+
1
M′1M
′
2
∑
(i,j)6=(1,1)
exp2
(
iCn1 Cn2 ;Zn
(
c
(i)
1 , c
(j)
2 ; z
n
))
> 1 + 4
}
.
An upper bound for J: We remind the following assumption
from (8): 
R′1 +R
′
2 > I(C1C2;Z)
R′1 > I(C1;Z)
R′2 > I(C2;Z)
The quantity J can be upper bounded as (see [19]):
J 6 J (1) + J (2) + J (3) + J (4), (30)
where J (1), J (2), J (3), and J (4) are defined as:
J (1) = P
(
1
M′1M
′
2
exp2
(
iCn1 Cn2 ;Zn
(
C
(1)
1 C
(1)
2 ;Z
n
))
>
)
J (2) = P
(
1
M′1M
′
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
exp2
(
iCn1 Cn2 ;Zn
(
C
(i)
1 C
(j)
2 ;Z
n
))
>1 + 
)
J (3) = P
(
1
M′1M
′
2
n∑
i=1
exp2
(
iCn1 Cn2 ;Zn
(
C
(i)
1 C
(1)
2 ;Z
n
))
>
)
J (4) = P
(
1
M′1M
′
2
n∑
j=1
exp2
(
iCn1 Cn2 ;Zn
(
C
(1)
1 C
(j)
2 ;Z
n
))
>
)
Now, we study each term individually:
• First, J (1) can be upper-bounded as follows:
J (1) 6 P(exp2(I(Cn1 Cn2 ;Zn)) >
exp2(−n+ nR′1 + nR′2))
= P
(
1
n
I(Cn1 C
n
2 ;Z
n) > −+R′1 +R′2
)
= P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(C1,iC2,i;Zi) > R
′
1 +R
′
2 − 
)
since R′1 + R
′
2 > I(C1C2;Z), there exists γ > 0 such that
R′1 +R
′
2 > I(C1C2;Z)+γ. If we choose  < γ to guarantee
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R′1+R
′
2− > I(C1C2;Z)+γ − ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
and to apply the Chernoff
bound, we have:
∃αγ− > 0, J (1) 6 e−αγ−n.
• With a similar reasoning, we can upper bound J (2), J (3),
and J (4) by quantities going exponentially to zero under the
given conditions.
Conclusion: : J goes exponentially to zero as n goes to
infinity. Therefore, lim
n→∞E(L(C)) 6 δ(). QED
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